To this day, it remains a mega-mystery in military circles. Why, at the height of the 1991 Gulf War, did over 120 Iraqi fighter planes flee to Iran, where they sat out the conflict on the ground? Well, there's plenty of speculation, but in his book The Media and the Military, Peter Young recounts one theory that keeps cropping up. And after 50 years in defence and foreign affairs - as field agent, journalist, publisher, and retired Griffith University Associate Professor - he knows a good theory when he hears it.
Peter Young: Whilst there's no evidence at all, and no one can say with any certainty, in the Iraqi Gulf War we were suddenly confronted with the whole of the Iraqi Air Force, which had performed quite well up to that stage against the Iranians. An experienced, well trained, well equipped, force with US, British and German technology, suddenly decamped overnight.
One answer to this may be, may be, that we saw the first real example of cyberwarfare on a grand scale in that somebody or something got to the Iraqi command/control/communication system, which left them (the aeroplanes) blind and unable to be directed. And this may have been the first instance of the microchip being used at this level in warfare.
Leigh Dayton: And we can never prove it and we could never say for sure who did it. That's another advantage of this cyberwar, isn't it?
Peter Young: Oh indeed. If you all sat around a dinner table, over a few glasses of claret you could well come up with the possibility that the Israeli Intelligence got in there, because they're specialists in that area. It could well have been the French, or the Americans who have been preparing for this for a long time.
Almost anybody can come up with a theory, except the hard facts are that a well-equipped airforce which had gone through nine years of war against the Iranians, with good pilots and a well-integrated air defence system, suddenly decided to avoid battle and flew itself to safety in a third nation.
We'll probably never know what happened to the Iraqi Air Force. Yet, as Dr Jeffrey Hunker notes, the possibility that nations may go to war, computers blazing, is very real. So real, that last year he was appointed Director of the newly established Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, the body responsible for devising a national plan to protect the United States against cyber attacks. From his office in Washington DC, Dr Hunker explains that cyber, or information warfare, goes well beyond the computer viruses, Trojan horses, back doors, and other silicon mischief depicted in Hollywood films and airport best sellers.
Listen to Jeffrey Hunker describe cyberwar Jeffrey Hunker: We're not talking about teenage hackers here or a disgruntled employee who takes action on his own. We're talking about nation states or terrorists who have systematic programs to attack US interests by breaking into our computers and information systems, stealing information, distorting or taking down the system to weaken or destroy the ability to protect ourselves.
Imagine the modern military. As the world saw during Desert Storm in '91, and again in last year's Desert Fox assault on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, today's well-dressed armed forces are kitted out with hi-tech weapons, battlefield strategies and communication systems, all dependent upon microchips and powerful computers that talk amongst themselves. That's why information expert Colonel Danny O'Neill - of the Australian Defence Force's Strategic Command Division in Canberra - talks "networkcentric warfare", rather than "cyberwarfare".
Danny O'Neill: The concept of networkcentric warfare really involves the utilization of a range of ships and aircraft in a fleet to detect or sense targets and allow another ship or aircraft to fire that may not be able to see it. We're much more reliant upon electronics in terms of sensors and guidance systems for weapons, the satellite-based global positioning system that allows you to determine where you are.
And all this information comes in electronic form which means it can be readily passed around the battlefield and made accessible to others who don't directly have the sensor in their hand. So there's a lot of passing information around the battlefield or at sea that hasn't existed in the past.
In other words, modern armies don't march on their stomachs, they run on computers.
Listen to Peter Young on the influence of computers on the military Peter Young: Well, computers are endemic, much the same way as a computer has now become part of everyday life. In the military they are now almost everywhere. For instance there are now aircraft that can literally monitor millions of square kilometres of airspace. They can monitor missiles moving and where they're going, they can give warnings, they can interrogate units to see if they're friendly or not. They have the ability to see what's happening on the ground, and all that information is then relayed back to a central headquarters which responds and relays orders to individual units.
And the individual units themselves utilise computers, for instance Rapier surface-to-air missiles use computers for targeting, cruise missiles use computers to constantly update their position. All of this information has to be integrated to ensure that you don't attack your own side and successfully respond to threats. Now, imagine if your headquarters suddenly went blind, was deafened and lacked direction.
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Clearly, the computer revolution has triggered a massive change in warfare that must astound veterans of earlier conflicts. The military's growing reliance on sophisticated computer technology makes it open to strikes against those systems, while simultaneously offering generals undreamt-of firepower.
But does this computer-driven "revolution in military affairs" portend radical shifts in the way future wars will be waged? Here's Dr Coral Bell, Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University and former Professor of International Relations at Britain's University of Sussex.
Coral Bell on high tech warfare Coral Bell: To tell the truth, it all depends on who's doing the fighting. A lot of military operations in the developing world are very low tech indeed. The conflict in Bougainville began with a flight of arrows, most of the killing in Rwanda was done with machetes. But for advanced military structures, such as the United States, the concept is distance warfare. And if you want to look at a small sample of it think about the recent fracas between the US and Britain on one side and the Iraqis on the other.
This was distance warfare by the people with the advanced military; as far as we know there were no casualties at all on the advanced side, there were great precision hits and rather low casualties, even on the side of the Iraqis certainly they were relatively low for four nights of heavy bombardment.
Distance Warfare - an appealing concept to leaders who don't want soldiers coming home in body bags. But distance warfare cuts both ways, cautions Professor Bill Caelli, head of the School of Data Communications at the Queensland University of Technology.
In the age of cyberwarfare, our enemies may target us from a distance. And us includes civilians. That's so, claims Caelli, an expert in information security, because increasingly the military piggybacks on civilian communication systems-telephone lines, satellites, fibre-optic cables and microwave links. And communication systems are, in turn, powered by or linked to other "critical infrastructures" of modern nations.
Prof.Bill Caelli on our critical infrastructures that are prone to cyberattack Bill Caelli: We're already seeing, I believe, what could happen. We've seen it in Auckland with the power grid failure. We've seen it in Melbourne with essentially the loss of gas and fuel. We've seen it with water problems in the case of Sydney. Now these are only pointers to society's dependence on critical infrastructures for its very operation. Those systems are computer and communications controlled. They are the new targets.
It's scary stuff. No wonder, back in Washington DC, Jeffrey Hunker has drawn up a long list of critical infrastructures needing protection. These include communications, water and electronic systems, as well as transportation, energy, banking, financial, health, medical, and key government services.
Jeffrey Hunker talks about two possible cyberattacks Jeffrey Hunker: I have two scenarios that worry me. One is we have a combination of cyberattack that disrupts emergency and police services at the same time that an attack with a bomb or weapon of mass destruction is taking place. The other scenario that concerns me is much more subtle. Somebody infiltrates an important financial or banking centre and, over time, disrupts or distorts the information contained in financial networks, and that isn't discovered for some time. When it is discovered, it could shake the confidence in the financial or banking system.
So the attacks could be quite obvious or quite subtle, but in either case could be quite devastating, and both scenarios keep me awake at night. The threat is here. There are several nations that have publically talked about developing an offensive capability to launch cyberattacks.We know that terrorists are developing or thinking about developing this capability.
But because the nature of the threat requires far less resources than to launch a conventional attack, it's very difficult to develop a specific threat picture that 'country A' or 'group B' could cause a problem. Instead, we know this threat is out there. In fact we know that there are very sophisticated intrusions occuring right now into government and private computer systems. I can't be more specific about the government aspect. You have to understand we're dealing with very serious law enforcement and national security issues.
The threat of cyberattack is going to be the next battlefield or the next war, and it's going to be part of the arsenal of terrorist groups. And when we're dealing with anything dealing with US government interests, I simply can't comment about that.
But respected American technology writer Dan Gillmor can. Here's an extract from his column in the San Jose Mercury.
JANUARY 31, 1999
Last week, an Internet service provider in Dublin, Ireland was forced to shut down temporarily after a cyberattack on its computers. Topping the list of suspects is the government of Indonesia. The Internet company was hosting a "virtual nation" on behalf of people who want to end the brutal Indonesian occupation of East Timor. In an explanation on its Web page, Connect-Ireland says the site had been probed repeatedly in the year since the domain was established. But the company wasn't prepared for what happened last week: simultaneous cyberattacks from locations around the globe.
According to Dan Gillmor, this isn't the first time a government took cyber-aim at an unwelcome website. The twist here is that an American-run Internet authority had granted the website a top-level national abbreviation. As Australia is "AU", and Britain is "UK", East Timor became "TP", a "virtual" nation independent from Indonesia.
Is this, then, a taste of things to come? Will nations one day wage "web wars"- hacker to hacker-with cyberspace contested as ferociously as geographical space? Possibly. But hi-tech warriors pose a more direct threat to you and me, warns Dr Willis Ware, an information scientist and policy analyst with the Rand Corporation, a prominent thinktank in Santa Monica, California.
Willis Ware talks about the difficulty in identifying cyberattacks Willis Ware: A small group of smart people can create all matter of mischief if they can penetrate a computer system here or there. It doesn't take an army to bring down what we refer to as 'critical infrastructure'. All it takes is a few smart people doing smart things from whereever they might reside. In this cyberscene, your opponents are often invisible, in a location that's not known, doing things that may not be wholly visible and the only awareness of their presence is the consequences of what they have done.
Willis Ware should know. Back in the 60s, he wrote the first ever report on computer security for the United States government, and has long waved warning flags about the impact of computers on personal privacy. And as defence expert Peter Young notes, don't for a moment think that privacy and cyberwarfare are separate concepts. The microchip guarantees that.
Peter Young: Well, the microchip has had the same impact of the crossbow and the nuclear weapon. But even worse, in that the microchip is an enhancer - a multiplier. Everything has been enhanced to a point where, if you or a piece of equipment gives out any form of emanation - heat or if you breathe - you create a signature and if you've got a signature you can be targeted and if you can be targeted you will be destroyed.
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In the big-screen thriller, Ronin, an international team of covert operatives steal a mysterious, well-protected briefcase. Amid the car chases, shoot-outs, and general movie mayhem, the rent-a-spies locate a rival by ringing his mobile telephone. They lock onto the signals bounced between phone and global positioning satellite, and, using CIA-supplied software, break the phone's built-in location scrambler.
Fanciful? Not at all. News report of attack on US embassies Last August, terrorists - equipped with rocket-propelled grenade launchers, automatic weapons, laptop computer and a satellite phone - bombed United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people. Subsequently, US agents implicated exiled Saudi billionaire Osama bin Laden, who they knew was hiding in remote Afghanistan. But where? Luke Hunt is an Australian photojournalist and Kabul Bureau Chief for Agence France Presse. He picks up the story �and his own satellite phone.
Luke Hunt describes what happened to Osama bin Laden Luke Hunt: On the evening of August 19 last year, bin Laden contacted an associate in Peshawar in Pakistan. The call lasted about 20 minutes, long enough for the Pentagon to get enough digital information for decoding. It then took another 3 hours to pinpoint bin Laden and transfer the information to the tomahawk's central guidance system.
Each tomahawk missile also has its own built-in digital guidance technology, which automatically corrects trajectory in flight, and carries a payload that can raze a 3 storey house. These cruise missiles have a 10% failure rate. But for bin Laden, over 40 missiles exploded exactly where planned. He did escape, and there is speculation he was tipped off during the 3 hour period required to pass on the digital information. Nevertheless, 24 people died in the US strike during the early hours of August 20 last year, and the mission succeeded in destroying terrorist training camps.
There are also signs that bin Laden is aware of the capabilities of the technology used to track him down. Afghanistan's ruling Taliban have constantly rejected requests from Western journalists to interview bin Laden in his current base in Kandahar. The standard reply is, "why? so you can file by Inmarsat and let the Americans bomb him again?"
Given how handy mobile phones are - to intelligence agencies - it's no surprise that, right now, the United States FBI is lobbying the Federal Communications Commission. They want the commission to rule that tracking the whereabouts of the United States' 50 million wireless phone users doesn't violate privacy laws, detailed in the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act.
Meanwhile, groups like the US-based Electronic Privacy Information Center are demanding that super-chip maker, Intel, recall it's next generation Pentium III microchip. Why? Because it contains an "electronic dog tag" which, when switched on, transmits a traceable Processor Serial Number, unique to each user. Remember, if you can be tracked, you can be targeted. And civilian targets are fair game in cyberwar.
Audio of Indian report calling for restrictions on US network security software MUMBAI 11 JANUARY 1999
The Defence Research and Development Organisation has issued a "Red Alert" against all network security software developed in the United States. And the Central Vigilance Commissioner, N. Vittal, is following up on the warning. He might make it mandatory for all Indian banks and financial institutions to buy only software developed in India. The concern about US-developed software stems from one basic insecurity - the data traffic and network security software that comes from the US can be easily hacked into and could prove to be a security hazard.
Currently, US software vendors can export only those "encryption software products" that can be "broken" by the US National Security Agency. This makes the quality of the US software exported to India doubtful from a security point of view. In a letter to Commissioner Vittal, the Defence Research and Development Organisation has said that it has begun to develop secure communication tools and will have an indigenous prototype in place in three months.
The odds that Yankee cyberwarriors will sneak into critical Indian computer systems are pretty slim. Still, India's "Red Alert" against US software raises a serious matter facing many nations, including Australia. You see, instead of writing their own secure computer programs, budget conscious military leaders worldwide, are, essentially, popping down to Software City and buying commercial products like Microsoft Windows NT. This troubles Bill Caelli, who's specialised in information security for over 30 years.
Bill Caelli: Let's look at the phenomenon of cyberwarfare, with the military moving to commercial off-the-shelf systems (COTS). The same systems that you and I use, that companies use, made by commercial software companies like Microsoft. Let's imagine that they're closed. We don't know how they operate. We don't know, for example to speak technically, are all the system calls fully documented? Are there any hidden calls into that operating system which could be secretly activated? I don't know! Do we have absolute guarantees that there are no such, what we call, hidden or undocumented system calls?
Let's not just think about software. Let's also think about hardware too. Are those chips that we've got fully described? Do we know precisely what's in them, everything that's in them? I believe that right at the present moment we need to think very carefully, particularly at the government level, on the nature of our multilateral and those bilateral agreements which will make it absolutely mandatory if a foreign country or a foreign company wishes to sell into our country those systems which we use in our critical infrastructure, then full disclosure is required. We must have the blueprints to the house, to use an analogy. We want the complete blueprints to the house. That's now where we are. That's where we have to be in the age of cyberwarfare.
As Director of the Australian Defence Force's brand new Information Operations section, Danny O'Neill acknowledges that's COTS is a fact of military life.
Danny O'Neill: We use a lot of off-the-shelf software. It is of concern to us and to military and government organizations worldwide. A lot of the source code, we don't have access to. You manage the risk by looking at where you want to employ the systems and software. If it's in highly classified systems you scrutinize the software closely. For lesser, for unclassified systems, it's probably not worth putting all that effort in. A lot of people worldwide using the software, say Microsoft Windows NT, are conscious of software bugs. They're more likely to detect something wrong in the first instance than us. But it is a concern.
Leigh Dayton: Do we have a protocol or agreement with the vendor...or do we just take it home and test it?
Danny O'Neill: I'm not the person to answer that question. It's outside my level of expertise. But the software in critical systems is under close scrutiny within our organization.
Much "close scrutiny" comes from Dr Brian Billard and his 60 colleagues with the Defence Science and Technology Organisation at Salisbury, South Australia. Billard specialises in "trusted systems" and heads up the Military Computing Systems unit.
Dr Brian Billard talks about the development of 'trusted system' technology in Australia Brian Billard: We have adopted an approach in DSTO in Australia where we say that most of the users can use a commercial off-the-shelf system which we will not trust, like the workstation on their desk. We say use a commercial system, but we won't trust it. And what we try to design into the architecture of the network is some few devices which you might attach to your computer, or at various places across the network, which will allow you to perform particular security functions or give you some measure of security.
We have a particular program called Starlight which is quite interesting and world-leading, we believe, of security devices which we are now commercializing and the first product of that is the interactive link which we hope will be available early in 1999. It's a particular example of a security device which clips on the side of a computer to enable a user to access two different networks from the one station.
In the military environment you might have a secret network and you might also want to turn around and do some work on an unclassified network, or maybe go out and surf the Internet to gather some information. And you want to be able to do your work from the same workstation without having to change computers and you might even want to pull in some information from the Internet into your secret system. But you want to do it in a way that you can be absolutely assured that no information can possibly leak out of your secret system by doing it from the one workstation.
Now, the interactive link allows you to do that. It clips on the side of your workstation and links up to both networks and, indeed, it allows you to have different windows on your monitor so that one window might be looking into the secret network and another window might be looking into the classified network linked to the outside world. And you can work on either of those windows and you can pull information from the unclassified into the secret.
Leigh Dayton: And by selling it outside the military system you're not giving anybody any hints about how you're protecting yourself that they could use again you are you?
Brian Billard: Well, this is a defence mechanism, it won't help anybody attack our system. The interactive link is so simple and so strong, very much stronger than other security that people have at the moment, that we believe that if commercial markets are developed it helps bring down the price to the military and helps us in the long term.
According to Brian Billard, several projects like Starlight are underway. They aim to keep military secrets, well, secret, and to guarantee that information moving throughout the forces is accurate and reliable, despite the use of COTS and heavy reliance on the public communications infrastructure. That's a tall order. For starters - as Coral Bell notes in her book, The American Alliance and the Revolution in Military Affairs - Australia's communications network has a few key "nodes" or "choke points" which could be "taken out" fairly easily.
Coral Bell: Some examples of Australian vulnerabilities? The electric grid that supplies Sydney and Canberra - defence headquarters and force commanders depend on it. The main communications link across the Pacific is housed in a couple of buildings in Sydney; the Optus and Telstra gateways sit in two ground stations; and the smooth operation of the Australian financial system clearing work of the Reserve Bank is processed by a computer in Brussels.
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Feeling nervous? Then by all means don't read a 1998 paper entitled Thinking about the Unthinkable: Australian Vulnerabilities to High-Tech Risks. In it, Dr Adam Cobb, a national security expert based at the Parliamentary Library, canvasses in terrifying detail the weaknesses just highlighted by Coral Bell. More worrying, though, is his observation that while segments of the military are fully aware of the situation, official government action has been minimal.
In 1997 an inter-departmental committee, chaired by the Attorney-General's Department, was set up to examine and review the Dudgeon Report, a classified government study of the nation's information infrastructure. We're still awaiting their response Of course, this doesn't surprise Rand Corporation analyst, Willis Ware.
Willis Ware: The fact of the matter is that this issue is so foreign to decision makers and they have never faced it in the past and, generally speaking, getting the attention of upper level managers and federal officials has probably been the number-one problem on this whole matter.
To help get the message across, in 1995 the Rand Corporation ran cyberwargames for high-level government officials and industry executives. Players were asked to consider scenarios, like this one set in the year 2000.
Telephone systems "crash" or are paralysed for hours. Misrouted trains collide. Explosions and fires erupt at oil refineries. The international transfer of funds fails and the New York and London stock exchanges plunge. Automatic teller machines randomly credit or debit accounts. The Internet is flooded with anti-war messages. Computers at US military bases worldwide slow down, disconnect or crash. And some of the military's most sophisticated computer-controlled weapons systems begin to fail.
What action should President Clinton take? He expects your action memorandum in 50 minutes.
American big wigs got an even louder wake up call in 1997. That's when a crack team of hackers, within the US National Security Agency, staged a telling exercise called Eligible Receiver. Using Software downloaded from the Internet, the team broke into computer systems that control the nation's electrical power grid. They could have unplugged the entire country.
Their main target, though, was the military's Pacific Command which is in charge of 100,000 troops. The cyberwarriors gained access to its command-and-control system, and could have crippled the whole box-and-dice. Cyber awareness skyrocketed. Here's Jeffrey Hunker, head of the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office.
Jeffrey Hunker: The United States government, President Clinton and his national security advisors take this issue very seriously. The President has been focusing on this for several years. Last May he issued a set of directives calling for the federal government to take immediate steps to protect itself from cyberattack. He also called on the federal government to work with major private sector industries, like banking and finance, and the telephone communications industry, to organize themselves to better protect themselves against this threat.
Just last January, Bill Clinton went further in a speech to the National Academy of Sciences.
US President Clinton announces the Cyber Corps programme President Clinton: Today, I want to announce the new initiatives we will take, to take us to the next level in preparing for these emerging threats. In my budget, I will ask Congress for $10 billion to address terrorism and terrorist-emerging tools. The budget proposal will include $1.46 billion to protect critical systems from cyber and other attacks. That's 40 percent more than we were spending two years ago.
Among other things, it will help to fund four new initiatives. First, an intensive research effort to detect intruders trying to break into critical computer systems. Second, crime detection networks, first for our Defense Department, and later for other key agencies, so when one critical computer system is invaded, others will be alerted instantly. And we will urge the private sector to create similar structures. Third, the creation of information centers in the private sector so that our industries can work together and with government to address cyber threats. Finally, we'll ask for funding to bolster the government's ranks of highly skilled computer experts - people capable of preventing and responding to computer crisis.
To implement this proposal, the Cyber Corps program, we will encourage federal agencies to train and retrain computer specialists, as well as recruiting gifted young people out of college.
The Clinton Administration has obviously set the pace for smaller nations like Australia. It's taken huge strides in understanding the complexities and possibilities of cyberwarfare. It's recognized that cyberwar is not just the exploitation of powerful computer technology to beat the enemy on the battlefield-not just smart weapons, superior intelligence, and high speed information exchange.
Cyberwar is also the defense of one's own targets, from military hardware, software and communications to critical civilian systems. In the age of cyberwar, information becomes the ultimate weapon and, as Jeffrey Hunker emphasizes, future battlegrounds will be everywhere we live and work.
But despite the progress, long-time computer watcher Willis Ware claims a real bottom line question remains unanswered: who's in charge of defense? Who must be ready to counter a cyberattack?
Willis Ware of the Rand Corporation on how cyberdefenses are being handled in the US Willis Ware: There are contests going on and we can watch them. The military and law enforcement all think they've got the job. And it's unsettled in any real sense, because it's really nobody's business, yet at the same time everybody's business. So at the moment at least in the United States, law enforcement agencies, most notably the FBI, are putting in place protective organisations and mechanisms for attacks against information systems.
The military is 'stepping out' because, at minimum, it needs to protect its own systems and may well be called to protect other systems. Some say that the National Guard, which is military in nature, but belongs to the governors of the individual states, should have a role to play, particularly when targets are local physical structures, such as water reservoirs, bridges and so on.
In Australia, no one has put up their hand. Cyberwarfare is not even on the national agenda. And when it comes to better-known information security matters-say the Year 2000 Bug or computer crime-military, government, and private sector leaders tend to act in isolation. Bill Caelli, of the Queensland University of Technology in Brisbane, says the only solution is for government to take the lead and get all the players to sit down at the table and talk.
Bill Caelli of QUT on the different perceptions of information in the military and in business Bill Caelli: At the present moment you are in a military camp or you're in a commercial camp. And that's a problem. In the military side we talk about having such things as clearances and secret clearances and all this stuff. On the commercial side we have another activity. Information becomes power. Information becomes enabling for your enterprise.
In some ways that's completely different to the way the military thinks, where information is controlled. So we have a dichotomy. And that's causing the problem. But we know that it's absolutely essential (that) we have to get the two groups together and I really think that that has to be sponsored right now through government initiative. We really have to get those board members talking to the generals. And talking seriously, not just talking around in a very ad lib way, but really getting down to the serious nitty-gritty. And that does mean for the first time we have to ask questions in the cyberwarfare world. What does 'classified information' mean in the 21st century? For example, we talk about great military secrets or great government secrets. But don't we also have great BHP secrets, great Telstra secrets, great Department of Health secrets?
At the end of the day, Bill Caelli bets that Australia will get its cyberact together. The country is just too computer-savvy-and too computer-dependent-to ignore the issue indefinitely. Fortunately, there's still time. As Willis Ware points out, the sky isn't falling....yet.
Leigh Dayton and Willis Ware finish talking about cyberwarfare By the way, before starting at Rand in 1952, young Willis earned his doctorate by helping legendary mathematician John von Neumann build the first computer at Princeton University. So it's only fitting that, as one of the field's pioneers, the final question goes to him. So, Willis Ware, is cyberwarfare a reality now? Has an undeniable cyberattack occured anywhere in the world?
Willis Ware: Leigh, I'm fond of joking that we do it to ourselves. We don't need an opponent. What has happened so far are shortfalls, accidents or design flaws. On the other hand, you might observe doing it to ourselves is great ground for practicing against unfriendly opponents. Nothing has happened in the world today yet that anyone is prepared to say, yes, that was a cyberattack.
Leigh Dayton: What about the Iraqi jets that flew to Iran, is that nothing more than scuttlebutt?
Willis Ware: I think it's an urban myth. The jets might be in Iran, but I would seriously question whether anyone infiltrated their systems with a computer virus.
Leigh Dayton: But like any urban myth, it could happen?
Willis Ware: Of course. Of course.
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